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6 
Marijuana Dog Searches After United States v. Unrue 
By: Captain Frederic I. Lederer, J AGC, Instructor, Criminal Law Division, T J AGSA and 
Second Lieutenant Calvin M. Lederer, MPjJAGC, Hofstra University Law School 
It appears from field reports that the use of Accordingly, an increasing number of Judge 
marijuana detector dogs has become more Advocates are encountering the numerous 
commonplace throughout Army installations. legal and practical difficulties connected with 
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dog searches. In our first article 1 we dis-
cussed the nature of such searches and while 
we briefly touched on the question of their 
legal foundation we chose not to address our-
selves in depth to the nature of the intrusion 
itself.2 In view of the recent decision of the 
Court of Military Appeals in United States v. 
Unrue,3 it now appears appropriate to examine 
the nature of dog searches within the Fourth 
Amendment context. Consideration of appli-
cable civilian case law is essential to a proper 
understanding of Unrue. 
The threshold question within this area is of 
course the very nature of the dog's intrusion. 
In the use of a dog per se a search within the 
ambit of the Fourth Amendment, and if so, is 
it an unreasonable one? In the abstract a 
strong case can be made that the use of a de-
tector dog is not a "search." The supporting 
argument would maintain that: firstly, the 
presence of the dog as it is usually employed 
(e.g., in barracks; at gates where vehicles 
normally must pause) is not improper as long 
as it remains in an area where there is a mini-
mal expectation of privacy (e.g., the "com-
mon" areas of a barracks) ; and secondly, the 
"operation" of the dog is not a search because 
its detection of odors is the equivalent of 
plain view (i.e., plain smell) 4 which is not 
considered a search.5 Thus a seizure would re-
sult without a constitutionally prohibited 
search. This approach to the problem, while of 
academic interest, appears to be of little value 
to the practicing counsel in the field in light 
of civilian precedents. The closest analogue 
to the dog search seems to be the magnetom-
eter "search" of airline passengers pursuant 
to the anti-hijacking program. The basic con-
tent of the hijacking prevention program is 
well known. Airline passengers who match a 
secret physical and psychological profile are 
noted. 
All passengers will have their carry-on 
hand baggage searched (physically and/ 
or by X-ray device) and will pass 
through a metal detecting magnetometer. 
Persons matching the profile who yield 
positive magnetometer readings will be 
searched.6 
7 
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While usually only those persons matching the 
FAA profile are searched after a positive 
magnetometer reading, it appears that the 
profile "match" need not be a necessary pre-
requisite. Indeed, even the magnetometer 
search has been held unnecessary by some 
Circuits. 7 Most of the airline case holdings 
have been based on implied consent of the 
passengers and/ or the peculiar border-like 
nature of the airline search. A number, how-
ever, have dealt expressly with the questions 
of the nature and legality of the magnetome-
ter search. 
Without exception, those cases that have 
dealt with the question 8 have held that the 
magnetometer search is indeed a search with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The marijuana dog search is sufficiently simi-
lar to the magnetometer search that it would 
be fruitless at this stage to argue another con-
clusion. What must then be considered is the 
question of the search's reasonableness. 
The principal civilian case on the subject is 
United States v. Epperson. 9 In Epperson, the 
defendant went through a magnetometer 10 at 
Washington's National Airport. After the de-
vice gave a positive reading, the defendant 
was searched. The search yielded a pistol. At 
trial Epperson challenged the magnetometer 
use alleging illegal search. The Fourth Circuit 
held that the magnetometer was a search with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment but 
also held that it was a reasonable one that did 
not require probable cause. After a discussion 
of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967) and TeTry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), 
the Court concluded that unusually pressing 
circumstances (threat of hijacking), minimal 
violation of privacy, and insufficient time to 
obtain a warrant all compelled a holding that 
the search was a reasonable one. Epperscm 
was cited with approval by the Second Circuit 
in United States v. Bezz.u In Bell, the Court 
stated: 
(the) contention of appellant that the use 
of the magnetometer constituted an un-
reasonable search is baseless. None of the 
personal indignities of the frisk discussed 
by Chief Justice Warren in Terry . .. are 
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here present. In view of the magnitude 
of the crime sought to be prevented, the 
exigencies of time which clearly preclud-
ed the obtaining of a warrant, the use of 
the magnetometer is in our view a rea-
sonable caution.12 
Judge Friendly, concurring, went a good deal 
further, suggesting that a search designed to 
prevent crime was clearly distinguishable 
from a search designed to find evidence of 
past-completed crime. The Third Circuit 13 
has also followed Epperson, although attempt-
ing to limit its opinion somewhat more specifi-
cally to the hijacking context than have other 
courts. The most recent case to present an in-
depth examination of the entire airport search 
problem is United States v. Davis.14 Davis, 
unlike the previously noted cases, did not in-
volve a magnetometer search, but rather a 
simple search of the defendant's briefcase 
which yielded a loaded gun. At trial Davis 
moved to suppress the weapon. In an unusual-
ly lengthy and scholarly opinion the Court 
rejected the Government's contentions that 
the search could be justified either as a Terry 
type frisk or because Davis did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect 
to his carry-on luggage. The Court specifically 
pointed out that even if Justice Harlan's con-
currence in Katz was accepted,15 that did not 
mean that "any kind of governmental intru-
sion is permissible if it has occurred often 
enough." 16 Having rejected these arguments, 
the Ninth Circuit used 17 the Supreme Court 
cases on administrative inspections 18 to sup-
ply the proper standards for airport searches. 
The court then stated: 
The essence of these decisions is that 
searches conducted as part of a general 
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an 
administrative purpose, rather than as 
part of a criminal investigation to secure 
evidence of crime, may be permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment though not 
supported by a showing of probable cause 
directed to a particular place or person to 
be searched. 
The Court conceded that such searches would 
detect contraband and lead to apprehension of 
law violators but believed that this conse-
8 
quence did not alter the essentially adminis-
trative nature of the screening process. The 
Court strongly warned all concerned that if 
the airport search were to be subverted into a 
general search for evidence of any crime it 
would exclude the proffered evidence. Davis, 
like the other cited precedents, attempts to 
walk a thin line clearly using a balancing test 
with the threat of explosion 'and death sharply 
tilting the scales. 
To date four circuits, and possibly a fifth,t 9 
have accepted the Epperson conclusion. The 
marijuana dog search is sufficiently similar to 
the magnetometer search to allow it to par-
take of the same rationale, if one makes tbe 
basic assumption that the Army's drug prob-
lem approximates the hijacking threat. While 
perhaps hard to accept, this proposition has 
apparently been accepted by the Court of Mil-
itary Appeals.20 More importantly, the argu-
ment can be made that the use of a marijuana 
detector dog which is primarily used against 
property 21 represents a lesser intrusion into 
an individual's privacy than a magnetome-
ter 2~ which is used primarily to search the 
person. 23 The lesser intrusion into privacy 
may outweigh the smaller probability of im-
mediate harm 24 caused by drugs. 
Before turning to consideration of the mili-
tary precedents, it is interesting to examine 
the only civilian case that, to our knowledge, 
has considered the use of marijuana detector 
dogs. People v. Furman,25 involved a confi-
dential informant who supplied a U.S. Mar-
shal with a tip that an individual of specific 
description would attempt to leave the San 
Diego Airport on a given flight to Portland, 
Maine, and that he might possibly have drugs. 
The information was transmitted to a state 
narcotics agent who went to the airport at the 
appropriate time. After verifying all of the 
informant's specific information, the agent 
had a marijuana dog borrowed from Customs 
walk around in the airline baggage area.26 The 
dog alerted to a suitcase belonging to the de-
fendant. The defendant was detained and the 
dog alerted to a second suitcase he was carry-
ing. The suitcases were then opened yielding 
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a total of 46 kilograms of man]uana. The 
Court found that the dog's alert, when con-
sidered along with the informant's informa-
tion, was enough to supply probable cause to 
search. The Court stated: 
Adequate foundation was laid establish-
ing the reliability of Link (the dog) as 
an investigative device. Evidence of 
Link's high level performance and great 
degree of accuracy in detecting mari-
juana odors justified reliance on Link's 
reactions as corroboration of the inform-
ant's tip. Although we are aware of no 
reported cases involving the use of dogs 
as marijuana detectors, their use in 
tracking fugitives has long been admissi-
ble in evidence to show an accused was 
the doer of a criminal act .. .. The officers 
as reasonably prudent men were justified 
in the search and seizure. 27 
Thus even if probable cause were to be re-
quired in dog searches (as indeed may be re-
quired in situations where regulatory type 
searches are inapplicable) there is some civil-
ian precedent for the dog's ability to supply 
probable cause. 
With the civilian cases as a proper founda-
tion it is appropriate to turn to the military 
case law. There is at present only one case on 
point, Unrue. Arguably, however, a proper 
understanding of Unrue requires an under-
standing of yet another military case, United 
States v. Poundstone.2B Poundstone involved 
a U.S. base camp in Vietnam that was ex-
periencing a serious narcotics abuse problem. 
The battalion commander concerned ordered 
a search of all battalion vehicles and accom-
panying personnel passing through the camp 
gate. 29 Thus the commander intended to stop 
the importation of drugs into his area. Pound-
stone was searched after the truck he was 
riding in was stopped. Having been found to 
have heroin in his pockets, he challenged the 
'learch in court. The decision of the Court of 
Military Appeals consisted of three individual 
opinions. Judge Quinn's lead opinion contain-
ed the following language illustrative of the 
entire opinion: 
Whether denominated a search or an "ad-
ministrative investigation," other types 
9 
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of examination of the person or his prop-
erty, although not based upon probable 
cause, are not violative of the protection 
against unreasonable search. . . . When 
such action is "crucial part of the reg-
ulatory scheme" of a Government pro-
gram and presents only a limited threat 
to the individual's "justifiable expecta-
tions of privacy," the Government may 
lawfully enter private property without 
probable cause .... In every case of de-
tention of person or property the stand-
ard of measurement of the Government's 
action is the rule of reason.30 
Judge Darden limited his concurrence to gate 
searches, stating, however, that "(t) his Court 
has long recognized 'the commanding officer's 
traditional authority to conduct a search in 
order to safeguard the security of his com-
mand.' " 31 Judge Duncan, in dissent, sug-
gested that the Court's opinion would not 
allow servicemen a reasonable expectation of 
privacy from inspection anywhere on an in-
stallation and that proof of military exigency 
would not need to be shown according to the 
majority's opinion.32 The extent of the Pound-
stone holding is difficult to determine. The 
case is too easily distinguishable from any 
other set of facts, 33 and by traditional analy-
sis much of the opinion can be branded 
"dictum." Yet it clearly revealed that two of 
the Court's judges preferred to expand the 
traditional limits on inspections when dealing 
with narcotics. With Unrue the Court's direc-
tion becomes clearer. 
Unrue arose at Fort Benning. Because of 
what was considered to be a serious drug 
problem, the 197th Infantry Brigade set up 
two mobile checkpoints within its area. At 
the first point, drivers' licenses were checked 
and the attention of vehicle occupants directed 
to a sign reading, "Attention, narcotics check, 
with narcotics dogs. Drop all drugs here and 
no questions asked. Last Chance." An "am-
nesty" barrel was located under the sign. The 
car in which Unrue was riding was stopped 
at both points. At the second, a marijuana 
detector dog was walked around the car. The 
dog alerted and the passengers were appre-
hended, disembarked and searched. Heroin 
was found in Unrue's wallet (vegetable mat-
HeinOnline  -- 1973 Army Law. 10 1973
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ter, presumably marijuana, was found under-
neath one of the car seats). The dog's alert, 
according to lower Court opinions, was the 
basis for finding probable cause to apprehend, 
with the search of the person being based on 
search incident to lawful apprehension. Unrue 
is not a clear opinion. Judge Quinn, joined by 
Judge Darden, first holds that a gate search 
theory will not justify the search stating that, 
even if a gate search is justified without prob-
able cause, the road block did not constitute a 
proper gate search. After finding that Unrue 
did not consent to the search, Judge Quinn 
holds that a commander may, in cases of "mil-
itary necessity" (defined by the Judge as 
whatever in light of all the circumstances is 
reasonable) be required "to maintain regula-
tory systems which necessitate inspection of 
persons and private effects without consent." 
The types of military necessity, says Judge 
Quinn, are searches to protect the security of 
a command (he does not define "security") 
and inspections to effectuate a proper military 
regulatory program. In his view, the drug 
problem at Fort Benning was ~4 so serious as 
to constitute a serious threat to morale, capa-
bility, and health. Judge Quinn cites the anti-
hijacking program for the proposition that 
the number of instances of prohibited conduct 
does not alone determine the degree of danger 
and need and means to oppose it. In its later 
paragraphs, the opinion suggests implied con-
sent to the dog search because of the posted 
notice. The Court discusses the use of techni-
cal devices to augment human senses assum-
ing for purposes of the opinion that Katz pre-
vents "Orwellian" surveillance using sophis-
ticated technological devices. At the same 
time, however, the Court seems to imply that 
the detector dog is a proper augmentation or 
extension of human senses.~" Abandoning the 
discussion, Judge Quinn simply points out 
(after having said that the use of the dog "to 
detect odors ... that a human inspector could 
not detect through his own sense of smell was 
not unreasonable") that, in his opinion, by 
the time Unrue's car reached the second check-
point, "any justifiable expectation of privacy 
as to odors emanating from it was just 'not of 
10 
impressive dimensions.'" Judge Quinn con-
cludes, somewhat surprisingly, by citing our 
earlier article as authority that the dog, hav-
ing been proved capable, was sufficient to sup-
ply probable cause to search. The conclusion 
is surprising in that the facts only show that 
the dog supplied probable cause to apprehend. 
The difference between cause to apprehend 
and cause to search may be of little practical 
importance, but constitutes slippage in an un-
settled area of the law. The earlier part of 
Judge Quinn's opinion would justify a regula-
tory search without dogs. Why then is there 
the special effort to hold that the dogs may 
supply probable cause? One possible explana-
tion exists. The Court may have adopted the 
same reasoning used in the airline search 
cases discussed previously, making the deci-
sion that the drug problem approximated the 
hijacking threat. Having accepted a balancing 
test that weighs personal privacy against the 
Government's interests in having combat 
ready troops, the Court may be saying that, 
in order to minimize the intrusion into per-
sonal privacy of the soldier, a dog that is suffi- 1 
ciently reliable to supply probable cause must 
be used. Thus the Court would be sharply 
limiting a rationale that would otherwise ap-
pear to allow virtually unlimited drug "shake-
downs" in barracks and vehicles. If this is in-
deed the true holding of Unrue, the defense 
counsel in a dog case must either contest the 
existence of "military necessity," or must at-
tack the dog's reliability or other facts of the 
case. ~6 Query: Is the drug problem to be 
judged by conditions Army-wide, installation-
wide, or unit-wide? What is the proper com-
munity? 
What then of the barracks search for mari-
juana, or indeed for any contraband? As in-
dicated previously there is authority in 
Poundstone and Unr'lle for regulatory searches 
designed to cope with problems that threaten 
the unit's security or mission. Limiting Unrue 
somewhat to its facts, the barracks search for 
drugs using a sufficiently reliable dog appears 
perfectly proper regardless of the barracks 
configuration. At some point, however, we ex-
pect that the individual's expectation of pri-
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vacy will become paramount, and probable 
cause will become necessary. For example, if 
a commander suspects a specific individual of 
drug abuse, there is no authority that we are 
aware of which would allow a search of the 
individual or his belongings without probable 
cause (unless as in Furman the dog is proper-
ly in the area, in which case the "plain smell" 
problem must be faced). While the search of 
lockers seems justified, there is no way of 
predicting just how far such preventive in-
spections may lawfully go unless PouncU3tone 
is accepted without reference to its combat 
setting. Unrue will allow stops and vehicle 
searches by marijuana dogs on an installation 
plagued by drug abuse, but what of vehicles 
containing civilians? Should the status of an 
individual matter? Are BEQ's or BOQ's quali-
tatively different from barracks? If not, what 
of family quarters on post? Similarly, ques-
tions as to the necessity for commander's au-
thorization to search (or judge's warrant) 
arise. Inspections, depending upon regulation, 
do not require probable cause or necessarily 
specific authorization from a unit com-
mander.37 Can a platoon sergeant expand the 
traditionally informal "health and welfare" 
inspection to include use of a marijuana dog 
without his commander's express authoriza-
tion? The answers are far from clear and 
hopefully will not arise if commanders are 
properly counseled by local judge advocates. 
PO'und.stone and Unrue arguably represent 
something new in military criminal law. While 
they present problems far beyond the scope of 
this article, they do suggest that evidence de-
tected by dogs is here to stay. It will be for 
later cases, military and civilian (including 
the predictable federal habeas corpus peti-
tions) to answer the questions raised within. 
A trend in the law, military and civilian, ap-
pears to be taking shape. As the age of the 
draft-free (perhaps publicity-free) modern 
volunteer Army dawns, judge advocates have 
no choice but to ponder the possible interpre-
tations of "reasonableness" and "military ne-
cessity." Where indeed will "reasonable" 
means 38 to search stop and 1984 begin? 39 
11 
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